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DID THE JURY ERR IN REACHING A VERDICT AND THE COURT ERR 
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INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT RESPONDENTS OWED APPELLANT 
$19,902.94 PLUS INTEREST? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant GUNNISON VALLEY BANK, a Utah Corporation, has its 
principal place of business in Gunnison, Utah. On August 11, 
1981, Respondents DARWIN and GWEN JENSEN obtained a loan from 
Appellant in the sum of $21,000.00. (T. 73, 78 and P Exhibit 2). 
On the same day they obtained the loan, Respondents executed a 
Promissory Note which specifically stated that the note was 
secured by "a real estate mortgage on residence in Gunnison, Utah" 
(T. 73-74 and P Exhibit 2). That mortgage was executed on August 
11, 1981. However, the mortgage document was given to Respondents 
to have it recorded, which they failed to do. No copy was made 
(T. 88, 123-124). Respondents failed to produce the mortgage for 
trial although it was under their control. They do not deny that 
there was a mortgage but they deny that it was a mortgage on their 
home (T. 267). The mortgage is now presumably lost or destroyed. 
Five documents were signed by Respondents on August 11, 1981, 
in connection with the loan. These documents all refer 
specifically to the mortgage on Respondents' residence. In 
addition to the Promissory Note secured by a "real estate mortgage 
on residence in Gunnison, Utah" (P Exhibit 2), the disclosure 
statement says, "This loan is secured by Real Estate Mortgage on 
residence in Gunnison, Utah" (T. 74 and P Exhibit 2). Two notices 
of a right of rescission, one signed by Respondent DARWIN JENSEN 
and the other signed by his wife GWEN JENSEN, say, "You have 
entered dinto a transaction on August 11, 1981 which may result in 
a lien, mortgage, or other security interest on your home" (T«, 89, 
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92, 110-111 and P Exhibits 4 and 8), The flood insurance document 
authorizes Appellant to insure f,the captioned property" under 
F.D.I.C. regulations requiring flood insurance on "property 
pledged as security for a loan with our bank" if such property is 
located within a flood hazard area (T. 92-93 and P Exhibit 5). 
In addition to the five documents signed by Respondents, 
there are two other documents which refer specifically to the 
mortgage. The appraisers1 report says that the appraised property 
at 182 East 1st South, Gunnison, Utah, is a residence appraised at 
$42,000.00 "offered as security" for a $21,000.00 loan. For the 
legal description of the land, it says, "See mortgage" (T. 76-78 
and P Exhibit 1). Finally, the State Farm homeowners' insurance 
policy adds Appellant, Gunnison Valley Bank, as "Mortgagee" on the 
180 East 100 South residence of Darwin and Gwen Jensen effective 
August 18, 1981 (T. 94-95 and P Exhibit 1). 
On August 11, 1981, the date the loan was obtained, Appellant 
gaye Respondent the executed mortgage with instructions to obtain 
title insurance and to deliver the mortgage to the title company 
and request the title company to have the mortgage recorded (T. 
123-124). 
On March 16, 1983, Respondents, then eight months delinquent 
in their payments on the Promissory Note, deeded their mortgaged 
residence to their friends, CHARLES F. and DOROTHY YOUNG (R. 63-
66, 94, 141-142; T. 214, 216, 261, 377). The home was valued by 
Respondent at $60,000.00 after remodeling (T.332). Because of the 
mortgage securing the Promissory Note in favor of Appellant, 
5 
Respondents made a sham transfer of their residence for token 
consideration of $3,000.00 (R.64) to be paid if the Youngs ever 
moved to Utah, not by cash but by "services rendered by 
purchasers" (R. 94). There was no written contract of the 
purchase price (R. 94). Three years later, in February, 1986, 
purchasers still lived in California and Respondents were still 
in possession of their home (T. 261). 
Since Respondents defaulted on the Promissory Note, Appellant 
began a mortgage foreclosure action. The jury trial commenced 
February 13, 1986, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District 
Judge in the Sixth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Sanpete 
County. 
At the close of Plaintiff-Appellant's case, the court 
directed a verdict that Respondents gave no mortgage to secure 
their indebtedness on the Promissory Note and thus that the jury 
could not consider the lost document issue (T. 217-218). Seven 
documents referring specifically to the mortgage had already been 
introduced and admitted (P Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8). 
Also at the close of Appellant's case, the court dismissed 
the second cause of action, fraudulent conveyance, as a matter of 
law (T. 218) and refused to reopen the case to allow Plaintiff-
Appellant to introduce the deed evidencing the fraudulent 
conveyance of the mortgaged property (T. 216). The deed, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23, was in Appellant's file in the court room 
and the necessary authenticating witness was present. 
The court instructed the jury in Jury Instruction 8 (T. 414) 
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that Respondents did not dispute the remaining debt on the 
Promissory Note of $19,902.94 plus interest of $11,405.76 )T. 274-
275, 394, 413-414). All three verdict forms included that 
Respondents owed Appellants the debt under the Promissory Note. 
The only jury question was whether, after granting Appellant's 
recovery on the note, Respondents were entitled to no recovery 
(verdict form number 1), to offsets (verdict from number 2), or to 
damages (verdict form number 3) (T. 428-429). 
The jury returned verdict number 3, which, due to an 
inadvertence, did not include a space for Appellant's recovery on 
the Promissory Note. Damages and punitive damages in favor of 
Respondents totaling $13,500.00 were awarded, but Appellant was 
denied any recovery. Appellant disputed the verdict but judgment 
was entered denying Appellant any recovery, despite the jury 
instruction. Appellant appeals from that verdict and judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case should be remanded because the trial court made an 
error in law and seriously abused his discretion under Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when he directed a verdict 
against ample evidence under which a reasonable person could have 
found for Appellant. See Management Committee v. Graystone Pines, 
Utah, 652 P.2d 896 at 897-898 (1982) and Asay v\ Rappleye, Utah 
593 P.2d 132 at 133 (1979). Finally, the judgment should be set 
aside because the jury verdict was contrary to Jury Instruction 8 
and against the great weight of evidence. 
First, the court made an erroneous ruling of law. The court 
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ruled that there was no mortgage to secure Respondentsf 
indebtedness. This ruling was made despite overwhelming secondary 
evidence showing there was a mortgage, now lost, destroyed, or not 
produced by Respondent, who was the last party to have possession 
of the document. Under Rule 70(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
applicable at the time, secondary evidence is admissible to prove 
the existence and contents of a lost document and the jury should 
weigh such evidence. U.C.A. 78-25-16 (1) and (2) says that parol 
evidence may be used to establish contents of lost or destroyed 
writings and writings where, as here, the opponent possesses the 
original and fails to produce it. Appellant was denied its first 
cause of action, mortgage foreclosure, by the court's erroneous 
ruling. 
Second, the court abused discretion in not reopening the case 
after the presentation of Plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff-
Appellant asked the court to reopen to allow introduction of the 
deed which was crucial to its second cause of action, fraudulent 
conveyance (P Exhibit 23). Under the standards set by this Court, 
reopening should have been allowed since the request was timely, 
delay would have been nil, respondents would not have been 
prejudiced thereby, and fairness and substantial justice demanded 
reopening the case. The result of not reopening was that the 
court ruled as a matter of law that there was no fraud. Evidence 
of fraud should have been allowed and the fraud issue should have 
been a jury question. 
Third, the jury verdict and the judgment entered were 
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contrary to Jury Instruction 8 and all three verdict forms. The 
court found that Respondents owed Appellant $19,902.94 plus 
interest of $11,405.76 on the Promissory Note. The debt was not 
in dispute. All three verdict forms included that the debt was 
owed. Yet the verdict the jury returned awarded Respondents 
damages and punitive damages totaling $13,500.00 but gave no 
recovery to Appellant. The wording of the form left the jury 
confused. They were instructed to find damages in a specific 
amount as a "balance" after the Promissory Note debt was 
considered. But in order to erase the total debt on the 
Promissory Note, damages should have totaled $31,308.70. In order 
to give Respondent any recovery, damages should have totaled more 
than $31,308.70. Therefore, the jury verdict and judgment entered 
should be set aside as a miscarriage of justice. 
Under Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "the 
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, 
may review the giving or failure to give an instruction" even if 
counsel made no objection at the trial. In Cook Assoc., Inc. vs. 
Warnick, Utah, 664 P.2d 1161 at 1164 (1983), this Court says that 
if a verdict does not show the clear intention of the jury, the 
appellate court may draw inferences "from the evidence, the 
pleadings, the jury instructions, and other relevant portions of 
the record." In the instant case, the evidence and the jury 
instructions clearly show that the debt on the Promissory Note was 
not disputed and Appellant should have been awarded that amount. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN ERROR IN LAW AND ABUSED HIS 
DISCRETION IN DIRECTING A VERDICT THAT RESPONDENTS HAD 
NOT GIVEN A MORTGAGE TO APPELLANT TO SECURE RESPONDENTS1 
INDEBTEDNESS. THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF THE LOST 
MORTGAGE AND IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A JURY QUESTION. 
It is a well-established principle of law that written 
secondary evidence and parol evidence of the existence and 
contents of lost written instruments is admissible and that such 
evidence should go to the jury. 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applicable at the time 
Respondents defaulted on the loan says in pertinent part: 
Rule 70. DOCUMENTARY ORIGINALS, BEST EVIDENCE. (1) As 
tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence 
other than the writing itself is admissible...unless the 
judge finds (a) that the writing is lost or has been 
destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the 
proponent,... or (c) that the opponent, at a time when 
the writing was under his control had been notified, 
expressly or by implication from the pleadings, that it 
would be needed at the hearing, and on request at the 
hearing has failed to produce it. 
(2) If the judge makes one of the findings specified in 
the preceding paragraph, secondary evidence of the 
content of the writing is admissible. Evidence offered 
by the opponent tending to prove (a) that the asserted 
writing never existed...is irrelevant and inadmissible 
upon the question of admissibility of the secondary 
evidence but is relevant and admissible upon the issues 
of the existence and content of the asserted writing to 
be determined by the trier of fact, (emphasis added) 
Thus, under Rule 70(2), the trial court in the case at bar 
should have submitted the mortgage question to the jury. The 
secondary evidence which indisputably refers to a mortgage 
includes five documents signed by Respondents and two other 
locuments. All seven documents refer specifically to the 
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mortgage. The Promissory Note says the loan is secured by a "Real 
Estate Mortgage on residence in Gunnison, Utah." The disclosure 
statement says, "This loan is secured by Real Estate Mortgage on 
residence in Gunnison, Utah." Two notices of a right of 
rescission say, "You have entered into a transaction on August 11, 
1981 which may result in a lien, mortgage, or other security 
interest on your home." The flood insurance authorization form 
says Appellant can insure "property pledged as security for a loan 
with our bank" under F.D.I.C. regulations if it is located within 
a flood hazard area. All these documents were signed by 
Respondents. Unless they can show that they in fact had more than 
one home in Gunnison, there is no question which home was 
mortgaged to secure the loan. 
In addition to these five documents Respondents signed, the 
appraisers1 report says that the appraised property at 182 East 
1st South, Gunnison, Utah, is a residence appraised at $42,000 
"offered as security" for a $21,000.00 loan. For the legal 
description of the property, the report says "See mortgage." 
Finally, the State Farm homeowners1 insurance policy adds 
Appellant Gunnison Valley Bank as "Mortgagee" on the 180 East 100 
South residence of Darwin and Gwen Jensen effective August 18, 
1981. 
All seven documents were admitted into evidence before the 
court directed the verdict that there was no mortgage. Under Utah 
statutes cited above, this ruling by the court was clearly 
erroneous. 
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Subsequently adopted Utah Rules of Evidence 1004 and 1008 do 
not change the legal principle of admitting secondary evidence to 
prove the existence and contents of a lost document under Rule 70 
but the new rules leave out the discretion of the trial court to 
make the initial determination that a document is lost. In their 
Utah Law Review article describing the 1983 Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Ronald N. Boyce and Edward L. Kimball describe the new 
Rule 1008 as follows: 
Rule 1008...expressly provides that the juryf if there 
is one, should determine the factual issues regarding 
whether a writing ever existed, whether a writing is an 
original, or whether other evidence of the contents of a 
writing correctly reflects the contents of the writing 
sought to be proved. 85 UTAH L. REV. 63 at 71 (emphasis 
added) 
Utah code Ann. Sec. 78-25-16 also says that parol evidence of 
the contents of a writing is admissible ff(w)hen the original is in 
the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered 
and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice." 
In addition to the Utah statutory mandate that secondary and 
parol evidence is admissible and that juries should determine the 
existence and contents of lost instruments, Utah case law is clear 
in allowing secondary evidence to prove the existence and contents 
of lost instruments. Meyer v. General American Corporation, Utah, 
569 P.2d 1094 at 1096 (1977) explains the lost instrument 
exception to the best evidence rule as follows: 
(The best evidence rule) however, does allow secondary 
evidence to be submitted at the court's discretion when 
it is not possible to obtain the original document. 
(Here, since the custodian of the records refused 
access,) the trial court correctly admitted the 
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disputed testimony into evidence as a proper exception 
to the best evidence rule. 
The lost instrument exception is explained in other Utah 
cases. As early as 1898, the Court said a witness could testify 
as to the signature on a lost contract. lf(T)he written contract 
held by (the Plaintiff) being lost, it was competent to prove its 
contents" by admitting parol evidence. Nelson v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 18 Utah 244, 55 P. 364 at 366 (1898). The admissibility of 
parol evidence to prove the contents of a lost deed is detailed in 
another Utah case where this Court says: 
A witness testifying to the contents of a lost deed 
is not expected to be able to repeat it verbatim 
from memory.... All that parties, in such cases, can be 
expected to remember, is that they made a deed, to whom 
and about what time, for what consideration, whether 
warranty or quit claim and for what property. To 
require more would, in most instances, practically 
amount to an exclusion of oral evidence in the case of a 
lost or destroyed deed. Bingham Livery & Transfer v. 
McDonald, 37 Utah 457, 110 P. 56 at 61 (1910) reh'g 
denied July 11, 1919, quoting Perry v. Burton, 111 
Illinois. 138. 
In Bingham, the Plaintiff, who failed to have his deed 
recorded and subsequently lost it in a fire, was allowed to give 
the essential details from memory. See also Scott v. Crouch, 24 
Utah 377, 67 P. 1068 at 1070-1071 (1902) in which this Court 
affirmed that secondary evidence was correctly admitted to prove 
that a lost deed was executed and delivered. 
In addition to Utah statutory and case law, other legal 
sources specify the long-standing legal principle. For instance, 
Corpus Juris Secundum says: 
In general the loss or unintentional destruction of a 
written instrument does not affect the validity or 
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sufficiency of the transaction of which it is evidence, 
or the rights or liabilities of the parties 54 C.J.S. 
(1948) Lost Instruments Sec. 1 
Circumstantial and parol evidence is admissible to prove 
the execution, nature, and contents of a lost 
instrument. Id. Sec. 13(d). 
The effect of establishing a lost instrument is to 
restore it to its original vigor and power. Id. Sec. 
16. 
If the requirements of the statute (of frauds) are 
satisfied by a signed contract or memorandum, the 
contract remains enforceable even though the writing is 
lost or destroyed. The contents of the writing can then 
be proved by parol testimony and the contract enforced. 
Corbin on Contracts (1950) Sec. 529 Statute of Frauds. 
Contents of a Lost Memorandum Provable by Parol. 
Since profert of a sealed instrument is not now usually 
required as a condition of the Plaintiff's recovery, the 
loss, theft, or destruction of the instrument generally 
has merely the effect of a loss of primary evidence 
which may be remedied in an action at law by the use of 
secondary evidence. Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 
1964) Sec. 1599 Effect of Accidental Loss or Destruction 
of Writings. 
In dealing with the general principle requiring the 
production of a documentary original if it is available, 
it has already been seen...that testimony based on 
recollection is an allowable mode of proof for lost 
documents (so long as) for documents having in 
themselves a legal effect— such as deeds and 
contracts— all the material parts must be established 
by the testimony to contents. 7 Wigmore, Evidence 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978) Sec. 2105(b) Document Lost or 
Destroyed. 
The production-of-documents rule is principally aimed, 
not at securing a writing at all hazards and in every 
instance, but at securing the best obtainable evidence 
of its contents. Thus, if as a practical matter the 
document cannot be produced because it has been lost or 
destroyed, the production of the original is excused and 
other evidence of its contents becomes admissible. 
Failure to recognize this qualification of the basic 
rule would in many instances mean a return to the bygone 
and unlamented days in which to lose one's paper was to 
lose one's right. McCormick on Evidence (3d ed. 1984) 
Sec. 237 Excuses for Nonproduction of the Original 
Writing (a) Loss or Destruction. (emphasis added) 
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It is a well-recognized principle that the accidental or 
unintentional loss or destruction of a written 
instrument does not, as a general rule, change or impair 
the obligation of the parties thereto; rights in real 
or personal property, or to a debt, evidenced by the 
instrument are not ordinarily lost. 52 Am. Jur. 2d 
(1970) Lost and Destroyed Instruments Sec. 2. 
Thus, Utah statutory and case law as well as many other legal 
sources agree that secondary and parol evidence is admissible to 
prove a lost instrument and that such evidence should be submitted 
to the jury. In the instant case, the court evidently made this 
error in law because he did not understand this legal principle. 
Despite having properly admitted the seven documents previously 
discussed, the court said, "(E)ven if you had a mortgage, it isn't 
recorded, how do you prove the burden is upon you?,f (T. 217). "I 
can't make a document....11 (T. 218). The court obviously thought 
an unrecorded lost mortgage could be proved no matter how much 
secondary evidence there was. The court also was troubled that no 
legal description of the mortgaged property was introduced despite 
the fact that the street address was included on both the 
appraisers1 report (P Exhibit 1) and the State Farm homeowners1 
insurance policy (P Exhibit 6). The right of rescission notices, 
signed by Respondents, refer to a mortgage "on your home" and the 
Promissory Note refers to the mortgage "on residence in Gunnison, 
Utah." There is no doubt which property was mortgaged. The legal 
description is included in a deed which the court refused to 
reopen the case to admit (see Point Two) (T. 214, 216, 218). If 
he felt the legal description was vital to establishing a lost 
mortgage, the court should have admitted the deed. 
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In addition to the court's error of law on the lost 
instrument issue, the court was clearly mistaken in directing a 
verdict that there was no mortgage. The seven documents proving 
the existence of a mortgage, as discussed previously, were all 
properly admitted. These documents refer specifically to the 
mortgage on Respondents1 home and the evidence is not subject to 
conflicting interpretations. However, in spite of all the 
evidence, the trial court erroneously directed the verdict that no 
mortgage existed. 
The court may not direct a verdict respecting the 
establishment of a lost instrument unless the evidence 
is of such character that there is no room for ordinary 
minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from 
it. 54 C.J.S. (1948) Lost Instruments Sec. 14. 
Utah case law agrees that the court cannot direct a verdict 
except where there is no dispute. 
It has long been established in our law that a court 
should not take the case from the jury where there is 
any substantial dispute in the evidence on issues of 
fact, but can properly do so only when the matter is so 
plain that there really is no conflict in the evidence 
upon which reasonable minds could differ. As was said 
for this court long ago...if...the court is in doubt 
whether reasonable men...might arrive at different 
conclusions, then this very doubt determines the 
question to be one of fact for the jury and not one of 
law for the court. Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Construction 
Company, 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 at 361 (1973) 
quoting Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 
134 P. 567 (1913). 
Under the Flynn standard for directed verdicts, the court in 
he instant case was clearly in error. Reasonable minds certainly 
Duld have found a mortgage. This Court in Flynn said the trial 
surt is to "consider the evidence in a light most favorable to 
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the party against whom it is directed." Asay v, Rappleye, Utah, 
593 P.2d 132 at 133 (1979). The mortgage issue in this case 
should have gone to the jury. 
In directing a verdict, the court is not free to weigh 
the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, 
whose prerogative it is to judge the facts. A directed 
verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds 
would not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented. Management Committee, Etc. v. 
Graystone Pines, Utah, 652 P.2d 896 at 897 (1982) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Thus, the court clearly made an error in law and abused his 
discretion in directing a verdict that there was no mortgage when 
there was ample evidence introduced in favor of finding a 
mortgage. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT TO REOPEN THE 
CASE TO INTRODUCE THE DEED WHICH WAS CRUCIAL TO ITS 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. 
Utah case law gives the trial court discretion "to grant a 
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional testimony 
after the case has been submitted but prior to entry of judgment." 
Lewis v^ Porter, Utah, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (1976). The standard for 
allowing a party to reopen a case is that the court should 
consider a motion to reopen to take additional testimony in light 
of all the circumstances and grant or deny in the interest of 
fairness and substantial justice." Id. citing 6A Moore's Federal 
Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 59.04(13) p. 59-37. 
Additional considerations favoring allowing a party to reopen 
the case are outlined in other Utah cases. These considerations 
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include that reopening the case would cause only minor delay, that 
the motion to reopen is timely, and that the Defendant's rights 
will not be prejudiced. Ross v^ Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71, 377 P.2d 
495 at 497 (1963) and Gardner y^ Christensen, Utah, 622 P.2d 782 
at 784 (1980). This Court in Gardner ruled that the trial court 
should have reopened the case at the beginning of Plaintiff's 
closing arguments to allow Plaintiff to introduce evidence as to 
attorney's fees since the witness was in court, the delay would 
have been trifling, and reopening the case would not prejudice 
Defendant's rights. Id. This Court in Ross ruled that the trial 
court should have reopened the case at the close of Plaintiff's 
evidence to allow Plaintiff to introduce proof vital to one of her 
causes of action. Ross v. Leftwich at 497. See also Girard v. 
Appleby, Utah, 660 P.2d 245 at 247 (1983). 
In the instant case, using these standards, the trial court 
abused his discretion in not allowing Appellant to reopen its case 
to introduce the deed (P Exhibit 23). The deed showed that 
Respondents transferred the mortgaged property to their friends a 
month after they received their delinquency-foreclosure warning 
letter. The motion to reopen was certainly timely, made after 
Plaintiff rested, before Defendants began presenting their 
evidence. Moore's Federal Practice says a case can be reopened 
for additional testimony "even after the case has been submitted 
to the jury...." 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 
59.04(13) p. 59-34. As in Gardner, the Defendant witness who 
could have authenticated the deed was present in court, the deed 
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was in Plaintiff's file, and the delay would have been nil. There 
would have been no prejudice to Defendants who supplied the deed 
in response to a discovery request and knew it would be evidence 
under the second cause of action. The deed was also mentioned in 
Plaintiff's opening statement so there would have been no surprise 
to Respondents. By not reopening the case for the introduction of 
the deed, the court denied Appellant "fairness and substantial 
justice." 
The second cause of action, fraudulent conveyance, should 
have been a jury question. Appellant would have introduced 
evidence that Respondents deeded the home to their friends in a 
sham transfer a month after receiving their delinquency notice, 
that there was no contract as to price, that buyer agreed to pay 
$3,000.00 for the house Respondent valued at $60,000.00, that the 
payment was not to be in cash but by services rendered (R. 64), 
and that three years later, at the time of trial, buyer was still 
living out of state and Respondent was still in possession of the 
house. 
POINT THREE 
THE JURY ERRED IN REACHING A VERDICT AND THE COURT ERRED 
IN ENTERING THE JUDGMENT THAT DID NOT GIVE APPELLANT 
RECOVERY ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE SINCE THE COURT 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT RESPONDENTS OWED APPELLANTS 
$19,902.94 PLUS INTEREST. 
The jury verdict and the judgment entered were contrary to 
Jury Instruction 8 and all three verdict forms. The court found 
that Respondents owed Appellant $19,902.94 plus interest of 
$11,405.76 on the Promissory Note. The debt was not in dispute. 
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All three verdict forms included that the debt was owed. The only 
jury question was whether, after granting recovery on the note to 
Appellant, Respondents were entitled to no relief (verdict form 
number 1), to offsets (verdict form number 2), or to damages 
(verdict form number 3). 
The jury returned verdict form number 3 (T. 433). The 
verdict awarded Respondents damages of $3,500.00 and punitive 
damages of $10,000.00 but gave no recovery to Appellant. 
In order for a verdict allowing no recovery to Appellant to 
be reasonable, the damages awarded should have amounted to at 
least the $19,902.94 debt plus interest of $11,405.76 or 
$31,308.70. The wording of the form returned left the jury 
confused. It instructed them to find specific amounts of damages 
as a "balance" after considering the Promissory Note debt. Since 
there was no place to enter the amount due on the Promissory Note, 
the damages would have had to be in excess of $31,308.70 to leave 
Respondents any recovery. 
Appellant disputed the verdict. See Appellant's proposed 
Judgment on the Verdict and the subsequent correspondence by 
Respondent. Nevertheless, judgment was entered giving Appellant 
no recovery, a miscarriage of justice. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says that the 
appellate court has discretion "in the interest of justice" to 
review jury instructions even if counsel made no objection to the 
instructions at trial. In Cook Assoc., Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 
P.d 1161 at 1164 (1983) this Court says the appellate court may 
20 
draw inferences "from the evidence, the pleadings, the jury 
instructions, and other relevant portions of the record" in 
reviewing a jury verdict where the verdict does not show the clear 
intention of the jury. In the interest of justice, the verdict in 
the instant case should be reviewed in light of the evidence and 
the jury instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded and the jury verdict and 
judgment set aside because the trial court made an error in law, 
seriously abused his discretion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, directed a verdict despite overwhelming 
evidence, and entered a judgment contrary to jury instructions and 
against the great weight of evidence. 
First, the court made an erroneous ruling of law in ruling 
that there was no mortgage. Such a ruling in a lost instrument 
case is against Utah statutory and case law and against a well-
established legal principle. This ruling was made despite a 
substantial amount of secondary evidence showing there was a 
mortgage, now lost, destroyed or not produced by Respondent. The 
jury was not allowed to consider the mortgage question and thus 
Appellant was deprived of its mortgage foreclosure remedy. 
Appellant was clearly prejudiced by the ruling. In addition, the 
court erroneously directed a verdict that contradicted 
considerable evidence, an abuse of discretion under standards set 
by this Court. 
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Second, the court abused his discretion in not reopening the 
case after the close of Plaintiff's case. The request to reopen 
was timely; delay would have been nil since the authenticating 
witness was in court and the deed was in Appellant's file; 
Defendants would not have been prejudiced since they produced the 
deed in discovery and were aware of the second cause of action 
under the complaint; and fairness and substantial justice were 
denied when the court ruled that as a matter of law that there was 
no fraud. Evidence of fraud should have been allowed and the 
fraud issue should have been a jury question. 
Third, the jury verdict and the judgment entered were 
contrary to Jury Instruction 8 and all three verdict forms. The 
court found that Respondents owed Appellant $19,902.94 plus 
interest of $11,405.76 on the Promissory Note. The debt was not 
in dispute. All three verdict forms included that the debt was 
owed. Yet the verdict form the jury returned awarded Respondents 
damages $13,500.00 but gave no recovery to Appellant. In order 
for a verdict allowing no recovery to Appellant to be reasonable, 
the damages awarded should have amounted to at least the 
$19,902.94 debt plus $11,405.76 interest. The wording of the form 
returned left the jury confused and the verdict returned is 
contrary to the jury instructions and the great weight of 
evidence. Damages must first equal the undisputed debt in order 
to erase the debt. Therefore, the verdict and judgment should be 
set aside. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, Appraisers' Report 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #2, Promissory Note, Disclosure Statement 
Plaintiff's Exhibit |4, Notice of Right of Rescission 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #5, Flood Insurance Authorization 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #6, Homeowners Policy 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #8, Notice of Right of Rescission 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #23, Warranty Deed 
DATED this 27th day of November, JL986. 
DALE--M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Appellant 
P. 0. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Served the foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing two copies 
thereof, postage prepaid, to W. EUGENE HANSEN, HANSEN, THOMPSON & 
DEWSNUP, Attorney for Respondents, 2020 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this 27th day of 
November, 1986. 
DALE-4«. DORIUS 
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APPRAISERS' REPORT—CITY PROPERTY 
Date of application for real estate mortgage loan 
Pull name of applicant... 
Occupation of applicant. 
CD 
Amount of Joan applied for $..^!!2r.\.vD.^Q.~ 
The property offered as security is located at: . 
..R^L^A-.A^-.S^iJc^ G^V^X&^S.v. .VVA^ .^ 
(Street address and number) 1 
Legal description...<^£A )A&Sfr-r^<&QJL 
(City) (State) 
LAND-
The land has a frontage of LOO. feet and extends b a c k ^ - . ^ . r O j . ^ feet. 
BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS-
Date building was constructed—Month
 r x Year . . L J . ^ . T : -
Building designed for use as (Residence, etc.) %Q%±\±^)?>^ 
Type of construction.... £t.\tL 
Number of stories \ ..Number of rooms J Number of baths. ..2, 
Sourceof water supply .S^."Ak^. Type of sewerage S ^ ^ k \ 
Type of heating system oil _._ Street paved, IH Yes • No 
Electricity,^E^Yes • No; Gas, • Yes jpNo 
CERTIFICATE OF APPRAISAL COMMITTEE 
I, (we) the undersigned, do hereby certify that I, (we) have carefully examined the above described 
roperty and that in my (our) opinion the fair value of said property as of this date is as follows: 
Land $.. Jp.>0©<*£? Buildings $ 3 A e *.QOO^ 
ite of Appraisal. 
Signatures 
and 
Titles 
of 
Appraisers 
«~ F m H M J 
i^KflLiim. 
P,U0V ^ ~ s" 
Due. . August 17, 1988
 Name Darwin. JeEaen and Qwen Jensen No. .8378. . . . ..j.v.»rrr: 
August 11,
 t981 
On August 1 7 * , 19.SS... after date, for value received, the undersigned jointly and severally promise to pay to 
GUNNISON VALLEY BANK, or order, at its office in Gunnison, Utah 
..Twenty-One Thousand.and.No/.lQO...#iMMMM DOLLARS 
In lawful money of the United States together with Interest payable...^9nHV*:y at the rate of T.r.T.P per 
cent per annum from date until paid, togt ther with costs and expenses of realizing on tne security, it any. a reasonable attorney s tee, and 
court costs. It the interest, or any payment on principal is not paid when due, the holder may declare the note due, without notice, and 
proceed by law to collect both principal and interest. If any undersigned or accommodation party becomes insolvent the holder may 
declare the note due. Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at ahy time without penalty except that a 
minimum charge may be required of $5 it the amount financed does not exceed $75, or $7.50 when the amount financed exceeds $75. 
The undersigned has deposited with said bank as collateral to secure the payment of this note the following property, viz: 
Real estate mortgage on residence in Gunnison, Utah 
.Payable Jaonthly $417.10 per .month for 84 months beginning September 17.,. 1981. . Said 
.payments, .to be. applied, .first, to. interest and then. to. principal-
and agrees that Bank or its assigns may at any time after the maturity of this note or before, if in the judgment of Bank or its assigns any 
Items of the collateral depreciates in value or the Bank or its assigns deems itself or themselves insecure, sell all or any part thereof at 
public or private sale, with or without notice or demand of any kind and hold and apply the proceeds upon this note at maturity or any time 
thereafter. Any surplus of collateral or proceeds of sale may be held tor or applied upon any liability, direct or contingent, which Bank or its 
assigns may then have against the undersigned. All expenses of suing upon, collecting or selling any collaterals may be deducted and the 
net proceeds shall be so applied. Bank or its assigns may purchase any or all items of collateral at any such sale. Any substituted or added 
collateral shall be subject to this contract which shall pass to and be in force in favor of any holder of this note Bank may assign or transfer 
this note and any oral! of the collateral securing the same, in which case the transferee shall have the r,ame rights with respect to this note 
and the transferred collateral as are hereby given or as otherwise may be possessed by Bank. The undersigned and all endorsers and 
guarantors hereof hereby severally constitute and appoint the holder of this note their to assign, transfer and endorse in their respective 
names for transfer on the books of the company or otherwise, all stock certificates, registered bonds or other securities, which are or may 
be pledged under the terms hereof. This agreement is subiect to the condtions appearing on the reverse side hereof. Presentment, 
demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of tlmaJAuUuziitnotice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the release of 
any security or any part thereof with or without substttution. ^ N ,^-~i 
Address. Gunnison . U t a h / i~>S _/^ __. n -c 
Phone 
NOTICE: See the reverse side for important information and conditions. 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
8-17-88 Due Date ?.:.*.',....?.?. Note No.. 8978 
1. Loan Proceeds $ 21,000.00 
2. Other charges: 
Credit Life Insurance (See 8 below) $ None 
Disability Insurance None 
3. Amount Financed $__ 2 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4. FINANCE CHARGE $ _ _ 1 4 ^ 0 3 6 . 40 _ 
5. Total of Payments $417.r.iP./.8.^..™?s...beg.9-17-81
 $ 35.036.40 
84 payment(s) in amounts and due as provided in attached Promissory Note. 
6. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 16...0 
7. The unpaid balance may be prepaid at any time without penalty, subject to a minimum finance charge of $5 if the amount financed does 
not exceed $75 or $7.50 when the amount financed exceeds $75. Reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs 
may also be collected. 
8. Credit life insurance is not required by Lender but will be purchased if requested. 
DBorrower desires that lender purchase credit life insurance at a cost of $ 
G Borrowei desires that lender purchase cisdil lite and Disability Insurance at a cost of $ 
£ Borrower does not desire cregti-Hfeor Disability Insurance 
8 - l _ _ l <E=£ -<%^~.^-, ^ o ^ n ,„ 
D»19 K —-" Borrower ^ ^ - ^ * " e ^ 
9. // any default occurs, Lender may offset against this loan arrfbank account or other amounts owed by Lender in any capacity to Borrower. 
This loan is secured
 hy
 R eal es tate mortgage on residence in Gunnison, Utah 
10. If this note is converted into an installment note the following disclosures may be applicable: 
Late charges may be imposed as to any installment not paid in full within 10 days after its due date and it imposed will be computed 
in the manner checked: & a late charge of 5% of the installment, but not exceeding $5; ^ian amount equal to the annual percentage rate 
stated above times the amount of the inctallment for the period from the due date of the installment until payment thereof, counting each 
day as V30 of a month If both methods are checked, either may be used 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE FOR LOANS OVER $5,000.00 
Purpose Business loan 
Borrower acknowledges receipt of a copy of the Note and Disclosure 
Statement with all blanks completed. August 1 1 , 1981 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, end-
orse, guarantee and promiee to pay the note on the reverse hereof and 
ill extensions an l^ renewals thereof, which extensions and -enewals may 
>e made without notice to or c >n*ent of the undersigned, and all taxes 
md insurance premiums and any other sums that may become due and 
>ayable under and by virtue of the provisions of any De-d of Trust 
or Mortgage), or other instrument of security securing the aforesaid 
lote, and hereby waive tal presentment, demand, protect, notice of pro-
eat, notice of dishonor, and notice of non r**ym«*nt: <b> the rifht. if 
"y, tr» the ^*»nefit of, o- tn direct the application of. any security hypo-
hecated to the holder until all indebtedness of the maker to the holder. 
owsoever arising, nhall have been paid; (c) the right to require the 
older to proceed against the maker, or to pursue any other remedy in 
le holder's power; and agree that the holder may proceed against the 
ndend^ned d'reotlv «nH independently of the maker, and that the ce*-
itteo of the liability of the maker for any reason other than full pay-
ent, or any extension, renewal, forbearance, change of rate of inter- , 
t. or acceptance, release or substitution of security, of any impair-
ent or suspension of the holder's remedies or rights again«t the maker, 
lall not in anywise affect the liability of the undersigned hereunder. i 
any undersigned becomes insolvent the holder may declare the whole , 
dm due. Hkia agreement ia subject to the "Conditions" be Sow. j 
j INT. PAID TO AMOUNT DATE PAID PRINCIPAL 
j J 
BALANCE 
CONDITIONS 
demands of performance, noticea of sale, advertisements, presence of property a t sale, and collection of commercial paper are hereby waived and Hank is hereby 
utborixed to sell hereunder any evidence of debt pledged to It. Any sale hereunder may be conducted by any auctioneer or any officer or agent of Dank. 
he word "Signatories," aa used herein, shall mean all maker*, co-makers, guarantors, endorsers and accommodation parties. 
he Signatories agree to pay prior to delinquency all taxes, charges. Hens and assessment against the collateral, and upon the failure of the Signatories to do so 
ank at its option may pay any of them and shall be the sole judge of the legality or validity thereof and the amount necessary to discharge the same. 
II advance*, charge*, costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred or paid by Bank in exercising any right, power or remedy conferred by 
is agreement, or in the enforcement thereof, shall become a part of the Indebtedness secured hereunder and shall be paid to Bank by the Signatories immediate 
f and without demand, with interest thereon at the annual percentage rate disclosed in the note. 
ink shall be under no duty or obligation whatsoever to make ot give any presentments, demands for performances, notices of nonperformance, protests, notices 
protest or notices of dishonor in connection with any obligations or evidences of indebtedness held by Bank as collateral, or in connection with any obligation* 
evidences of indebtedness which constitute In whole or in part the indebtedness secured hereunder. 
ran the transfer of all or any part of the indebtedness Bank mmy transfer all or any part of the collateral and shall be fully discharged thereafter from all 
bility and responsibility with respect to such collateral so transferred, and t h e transferee shall be vested with all tne rights and power* «.f Bank hereunder with 
pact to such collateral so transferred; but with respect to any collateral not so transferred Bank shall retain all rights and powers hereby given. 
itil all indebtedness ."hall have been paid in full the power of sale and all other rights, powers and remedies granted to Rank hereunder shall"continue to cci« t 
I may be exercised by Bank at any time and from time to time irrespective of the fact that the indebtedness or any part thereof may have become barred by any 
tate of limitations, or that the personal liability of the Signatories may have 
itk may exercise its banker's Hen or right of set-off with respect to the Indebtedness in the same manner aa if the indebtedness were unsecured. Any forbear-
e or failure or delay by Bank In exercising any right, power or remedy uereender snail not be deemed to be a waiver of such right, power or remedy, and 
• single or partial exercise of* any right, power or remedy hereunder shall not preclude the further exercise thereof; and every right, power and remedy of Bank 
U sondaee hi foil force and effect until such right* power or ismsilj Is specifically waived by an instrument in writing executed by Bank. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
Darwin Jesnen and Gwen Jensen 
(Identification • ! Transaction) 
NOTICE TO CUSTOMER REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW: 
You have entered into a transaction on August n , 1981 , which may result in a 
(Data) 
lien, mortgage, or other security interest on your home. You have a legal right under 
federal law to cancel this transaction, if you desire to do so, without any penalty or 
obligation within three business days from the above date or any later date on which 
all material disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act have been given to you. 
If you so cancel the transaction, any lien, mortgage, or other security interest on your 
home arising from this transaction is automatically void. You are also entitled to receive 
a refund of any downpayment or other consideration if you cancel. If you decide to can-
cel this transaction, you may do so by notifying: 
Gunnison Valley Bank 
.__. (M«m«" of Cro4itor) " 
rt Gunnison, Utah 84634 
(Addross «t Creditor's Pine* of Business) 
by mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of Augsut u , 1981 . 
(Dnt») 
You may also use any other form of written notice identifying the transaction if it is de-
livered to the above address not later than that time. This notice may be used for that 
purpose by dating and signing below. 
I hereby cancel this transaction. 
( 0«H) (Customer's Itfnnhtro) 
See reverse side for important information about your right of rescission. 
I, the Customer, hereby acknowledge receipt of 2 copies of the aforesaid Notice of 
Right of Rescission which have been given unto me this.JJ^hday of August , ISBI . 
T^fc 
. « . . * - -H- z - l SF Row. ^s~#3 
r#.>Cty> .Cr£ Cy/^ 
Gentlemen: •' 
t v 
As consideration for CoavMA.^rv\ XJCK W v y Dank making us a loan or loans, 
„ securcd_by the captioned property, we hereby aiirec and authorize ^ O \ A ^ ^ ^ ^ 
V t a ^ l M Bunk to place Flood Insurance on this property if required 
by F.D.I.C. regulation. (F.D.I.C. regulations require insurance on any 
property pledged as security for a loan with our bank, if the property is 
located within an area designated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development as having a special flood hazard, and where Flood Insurance is 
available under the National Flood Insurance Act of 11303.) \''c further agree 
to pay the cost.of any such insurance immediately upon demand. 
K^visV.lV'fftl 
WateX 
C 
^ 
nL 
As of 
* 
W\wS^ \\, $ mi it. appears that : 
/ Property not located i?> flood hazard area according to flood 
hazard area boundary maps. 
/ / Unable to determine flood hazard area because boundary map not 
available as of this date. 
/ / Property is'in' flood hazard area but flood insurance not available 
because the community has not qualified for participation in the 
National Flood Insurance Program as of this date. 
.NOTE; After July 1, 107f> no loans secured by improved real 
estate or mobile hones in a designated flood hazard area 
may be made unless covered by flood insurance, regardless of 
whether or not the community lias qualified to participate 
in the program. 
/ / Property is, in flood hazard area where flood insurar.ee is available 
and mandatory. Evidence of flood insurance coverage has been 
obtained. .• { 
p.•<».*•*•• y :s •: i : 1 .vu:' l\i • -:i -il area ;ic •;>••»}: r ; - I A U M .I:: ! \ o 
hr.s !irua' ;>eMI.. »•.• ;,r. ;uv:»r(U; >•<• wit); rv ,:;]o . \ . ; T : J S 
done regardless of, vJielher or noi J'JO<J(! *r<v\i 
•...v fl'yi'- '• 
,..nw- ' - . . - • , « • • • • 
n 
f)9fif)^<y^.y c^. •Above chccicer! bv 
.) 
km^_ 
State Farm General Instil # Company 
»ck Company with Home Office in Bioomington, Illinois 
Declarations 
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the 
premium and compliance with all applicable provisions of this policy. 
l M - P c l - 5 5 2 l ^ l i Policy Number Replaces No — — 
• d Insured and Mailing Address 
JSEhU&ARyiN A & GWEN R 
BOX M? 
ylNISOW^CO 64L3M 
M E M O R A N D U M OF I N S U R A N C E 
lO^O-MM 
"HOPxTGAGEE ADDED" 
EFFECTIVE ft-lfi-fcl '> 
V 
M f l - f l i Effacti»Pate 
12 flONTHS Policy Period 
.Expiration of Policy Period 
The policy period begins end 
ends at 12:01 AM Standard 
time et the residence premises, 
unless otlterwise shown below. 
Lsn.s .Inflation Coverage Index Noon Standard time. 
Form 3 
m 
Homeowners Policy 
Limits of Liability Property and Coverages 
Section I 
S53DD A Dwelling 
3QHSP B Parsonal Property 
lriaSTP C LosfofUe 
Section II 
1Q0QQD L Personal Liability (each occurrence) 
V f f l M Medical Pay menu to Others (each person) 
rms, Options and Endorsements 
>71G3.1 SPECIAL FORh 
TOON J JEWELRY AND FURS 
TOON K FIREARMS 
:?3S? AMENDATORY END 
ihs.nn Total Premium 
.First Annual Premium 
Credit Applied: 
Automatic Renewal — If the Policy Period it shown 
as 12 months, this policy will be renewed auto-
matically subject to the premiums, rules and forms 
in effect for each succeeding policy period. If this 
policy is terminated, we will give you and the 
Mortgagee/LienhoWer written notice In compliance 
With the policy provisions or as required by law. 
IF MOBILE HOME — DESCRIPTION: 
Location of Residence Premises 
(If different than Mailing Address) 
1&0 EAST 100 SOUTH 
GUNNISON-.CO fiMb3M 
Builders' Risk 
Newer Home 
Home Security 
tductibiet - Section I 
"1(1(1 All Peril (includes Wind. Hail and Theft unless a higher deductible is shown below.) 
.Wind and Hail 
Theft 
In case of loss under this policy, we 
cover only that part of the loss over 
the deductible stated. 
Mortgagee or 
Llanholdar n 
Paye Addit ional Insured 1ST 
UNNISON VALLEY BANK 
•0 BOX MIS 
iUNNISOKSUT &Mb3M 
3WTS Mortgagaa or 
2ND Llanholdar D Loss Payae 
• 
Additional Inaurad 
N.2 
In U.S.A. 
Your policy consists of this pege, any endorsements 
end the policy form. Keep these together. 
6 
Countersigned ^ ^ / ^ V ^ 
*-{?&* 
Agent 
EFFECT OF RESCISSION. When a customer exercises his right to rescind un-
der paragraph (a) of this section, he is not l iable for any finance or other charge, 
and any security interest becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 10 days 
after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the customer 
any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and 
shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any 
security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any 
property to the customer, the customer may retain possession of i t . Upon the 
performance of the creditor's obligations under this section, the customer shall 
tender the property to the creditor, except that i f return of the property in kind 
would be impracticable or inequitable, the customer shall tender i ts reasonable 
value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence 
of the customer, at the option of the customer. If the creditor does not take pos-
session of the property within 10 days after tender by the customer, ownership 
of the property vests in the customer without obligation on his part to pay for i t . 
CONFIRMATION 
MORE THAN 3 BUSINESS DAYS HAVE ELAPSED since the undersigned 
received the above and foregoing NOTICE OF RIGHT OF RESCISSION and 
other Truth-In-Lending Disclosures concerning the transaction identified 
on reverse hereof. The undersigned certifies that the transaction has not 
been rescinded. ^ 
Date^w-; ;V / 1 19 C)-
(Customer's Signature) 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
Darwin Jeneen and Gwen Jensen 
-—•--—-~--—--———-—~—~~~ (Idontificetien of Transaction) 
NOTICE TO CUSTOMER REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW: 
You have entered into a transaction on August 11, 1981 which may result in a 
(Data) 
lien, mortgage, or other security interest on your home. You have a legal right under 
federal law to cancel this transaction, if you desire to do so, without any penalty or 
obligation within three business days from the above date or any later date on which 
all material disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act have been given to you. 
If you so cancel the transaction, any lien, mortgage, or other security interest on your 
home arising from this transaction is automatically void. You are also entitled to receive 
a refund of any downpayment or other consideration if you cancel. If you decide to can-
cel this transaction, you may do so by notifying: 
Gunnison Valley Bank 
at 
(Nomt of Creditor) 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
(Address of Creditor's Place of •titiness) 
by mail or telegram sent not later than midnight of August u , 1981 . 
(Dot*) 
You may also use any other form of written notice identifying the transaction if it is de-
livered to the above address not later than that time. This notice may be used for that 
purpose by dating and signing below. 
I hereby cancel this transaction. 
(Customer's S^MOttiro) 
See reverse side for important information about your right of rescission. 
I, the Customer, hereby acknowledge receipt of 2 copies of the aforesaid Notice of 
Right of Rescission which have been given unto me this_Iithday of August , 19_S1_ . 
r>{Jv; 
y i ^ ^ ^ ; . -W">*Q.^ 
si 
£?fas' — 
'••) 
EFFECT OF RESCISSION. When a customer exercises his right to rescind un-
der paragraph (a) of this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, 
and any security interest becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 10 days 
after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the customer 
any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and 
shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any 
security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any 
property to the customer, the customer may retain possession of it. Upon the 
performance of the creditor's obligations under this section, the customer shall 
tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind 
would be impracticable or inequitable, the customer shall tender its reasonable 
value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence 
of the customer, at the option of the customer. If the creditor does not take pos-
session of the property within 10 days after tender by the customer, ownership 
of the property vests in the customer without obligation on his part to pay for it. 
CONFIRMATION 
MORE THAN 3 BUSINESS DAYS HAVE ELAPSED since the undersigned 
received the above and foregoing NOTICE OF RIGHT OF RESCISSION and 
other Truth-In-Lending Disclosures concerning the transaction identified 
on reverse hereof. The undersigned certifies that the transaction has not 
been rescinded. / 
/ . ^~'>'/ ; 
D a l t L Z ^ LL 19 ft' ^ y ^ ^ ^ - ^^*.t*u<*±zz=.z=L.. 
/ y (Customer's Signature) 
HfcUUHUfcU . i - m - i f . . 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: REQUEST OF Darwin Jensen 
FC ICOhDER 
' ^ ^ ^ 
..JtJ..r/£?y£VriLi 
>:r PAID - JANCT J . L D N D *.AWT.T \ - : • ; -«K. IV wxo i 
i , 6.50 I:Y H ^ ^ I S ^ ^ A ^ der^i JTY 
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GRANTOR'S *2L 
Space Above for Recorder's Use SRANTETS XL: 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
DARWIN JENSEN, aka DARWIN A. JENSEN, and GWEN JENSEN, aka GWEN MARIE * grantor 
JENSEN, h i s w i fe ^ ^
 0 , , . . . . u 
of GUNNISON »County of SANPETE , State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEYS and WARRANT S to CHARLES F. YOUNG and DOROTHY M. YOUNG, h i s wi fe , 
405 East Fairview #7 
of Glendale 
for the sura of TEN and 00/100-
, County of LOS ANGELES 
, grantees 
CALIFORNIA 
, State of Utah 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in SANPETE County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point North 89° West 1.50 chains from the Northeast Corner 
of Block 8, Plat "A", Gunnison City Survey, Sanpete County, State of Utah; thence 
/South 1° West 3.75 chains, thence North 89° West 1.50 chains, thence North 
1° East 3.75 chains, thence South 89° East 1.50 chains to beginnings Containing 
0.56 acre, more or less. Located in Lots 1 and 8, Block 8, Plat T , Gunnison 
City Survey. 
Together with all the iirprovements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or 
in anywise appertaining thereto, together with One (1) share of water in the 
^^ ..GunjiiaQri Irri^atiDiLCanpanv. ____ - — 
Beginning!). 20 chain South and North 89° 30' East 6.33 chains frcm the South-
west Corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 33, Township 19 South, Range 1 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 89° 30' East 1.98 chains, 
thence North 1° 15' West 7.50 chains, thence South 13° 40' West 7.74 chains to 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acre. 
FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIONS SEE ATTACHED RIDER MARKED EXHIBIT "A". 
/ 
WITNESS the hand sof said grantor s, this 16th day of March 
Signed in the presence 
, 19 83 
; ;^J&^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of SANPETE 
8S. 
On the 16th day of March , 19 83 
personally appeared before me Darwin Jensen, aka Darwin A. Jensen, and Gwen Jensen, 
^Marie Jensen, h i s wife , 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
aka 
me tnat they executed the 
ZL J r i^czz^ . . 
Norma S. Wanlass Notary Public, 
expires .Jun£..2-...1981 Residing in _ . . ^ U ^ . U t ^ _ . Ji64.2 _ 
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
WARRANTY DEED - KELLY CO.. St W. NINTH SO.. I L C L MOB 
123 
V^^lVilVllOOiWIX ^ p 
M-04* vftt 
\ I 
! i 
EXHIBIT MA" 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of the Southwest (Xiarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 33, Township 19 South, Range 1 East of the Salt lake Base and 
JJeridian; thence South 89° 30' West 11.79 chains, thence North 1° 15' West 7.70 
/hains, thence North 15° East 2.70 cteins, thence North 89° 30' East 11.32 chains, 
thence North 6.16 chains, thence East 10.00 chains, thence South 10.00 chains, thence 
East 0.25 chain, thence South 6.36 chains, thence West 10.25 chains to beginning. 
Containing 28.57 acres. 
together with all the improvements and appurterances thereunto belonging or in 
anywise appertaining thereto. 
( uarwin A. Jeniy^H^ 
i^pf/^^ S//rtiu\,/s*u,u< 
Owen Marie Jensen / 
